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Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been rigorously examined by scholars of
international business. While recent studies have achieved a general consensus with
regard to the political and economic determinants of FDI inflows and outflows, this
paper sought to reconcile two disparate segments of the literature – regime type and
political climate – based upon recently available events data. The study ultimately
failed to establish support for its hypothesis that bilateral political ties can substantively
mitigate political risk to investment in states with autocratic regimes, but demonstrates
a necessity to look beyond country-level political risk factors and further examine those
of the dyad in making foreign investment decisions.
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Introduction:
In this era of economic globalism, scholars of international business have sought to
address a salient question: are the interests of multinational enterprises (MNEs)
conflictual with those of democratic governance? In recent literature on the non-market
determinants of FDI, this question has been approached by examining levels of
investment in countries with either democratic or autocratic regimes. It has been shown
that the benefits of transparency and accountability for investments found in states with
democratic regimes far outweigh the benefits of low wages and exploitative contracts
that MNEs can reap by investing in states with autocratic regimes. However, this
general consensus is vulnerable to the criticism that recent studies have examined only
country-level political risk factors and, as such, upheld a dichotomous view of
democracy and autocracy that does not reflect the range of political risk as it relates to
multinational investor preference. By including a larger sample of home countries than
in recent literature and introducing measures for bilateral political risk to existing
models of FDI, this paper seeks to improve the generalizability of relationships
established in prior studies, uncover the determinants of FDI that may exist at the
dyadic level of analysis, and further examine the consensus that the interests of MNEs
are complementary with those of democratic governance.
This paper begins in the Background section with a definition of FDI and brief
discussion of its importance and theory. A section for Literature follows, in which the
methodology and objective of recent studies are summarized. In the Extension, this
study is positioned in the existing literature and its principal hypotheses are outlined.
The paper then describes the Methodology and Data that was adopted to test the
hypotheses, makes Predictions in accordance with intuition and recent studies, and
presents its Results. The potential Flaws are then discussed, followed by a Conclusion,
which offers a suggestion for further research.
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Background and Definitions:
FDI describes the investment of privately owned capital from an MNE to operations in
a foreign country. To qualify as FDI, an investment must give the MNE some degree of
control over operations abroad. FDI has been widely studied because of its implications
for the world economy. According to Nathan Jensen, “FDI is an engine of employment,
technological progress, productivity improvements, and ultimately economic growth”
(Jensen 2003, 587). As such, generating inflows of FDI is considered to be a crucial
element of economic development (Jensen 2003, 587-588).
Dunning’s Eclectic Theory of FDI is the commonly accepted paradigm for
decomposing the advantages that FDI confers upon firms – ownership, location, and
internalization. With regard to ownership, engaging in FDI projects allows MNEs to
leverage the distinct competencies of their business practices – whether operational,
intellectual, or brand superiority – to outperform competitors in the host market and
generate returns in excess of what is possible at home. The advantage of location refers
to the ability of MNEs to supply a foreign market through production in the host
country, rather than exports to it. This allows the sale of goods that, due to trade
barriers or large physical characteristics, may be otherwise unprofitable. Along similar
lines, FDI also benefits MNEs if an abundance of natural resources in the host country
reduces input prices, or if a highly educated workforce can produce quality goods.
Finally, the advantage of internalization refers to the extension of well-established
corporate oversight and hierarchical structures to a foreign market that may be poorly
developed. This describes why MNEs may choose to engage in FDI, as opposed to
simply licensing production to a firm in the host country (Jensen 2003, 591). These
advantages allow MNEs to overcome the liability of being foreign and succeed in
markets outside of their home.
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Literature:
Scholars have demonstrated the extent to which geographic, economic, and
demographic features of a host country – market and cost based elements of Dunning’s
advantage of location – can attract inflows of FDI. Geographic features, such as an
abundance of natural resources in the host country, can decrease input prices and thus
increase the profitability of operations abroad. Economic factors also have a great deal
of explanatory power. For instance, market size is an indicator for an economy’s ability
to absorb large amounts of FDI, and market growth is often directly correlated with
returns to investment. Finally, the demographic features of a host country can promote
inflows of FDI. Human capital of a workforce (operationalized as average schooling,
literacy, etc.) is one such example.
With regard to the non-market determinants of FDI, regime type studies have
examined the extent to which U.S. MNEs prefer to invest in states with autocratic
regimes. Alternatively, scholars focusing on political climate have attributed flows of
FDI to international and intranational cooperation and conflict. Each has sought to
uncover the preferences of international investors as they relate to political risk to
investment.
The previously untested assumption in the regime type literature is that MNEs
prefer to invest in peripheral countries, as their market power is relatively greater in
emerging markets and can be leveraged to gain unduly favorable terms for business
(Oneal, 568). Furthermore, it is assumed that MNEs prefer to invest in states with
autocratic regimes, whose repression of unions and collective bargaining ensures low
wages, and whose popular suppression allows the formation of exploitative contracts
(Jensen, 593). This conjecture raises a salient question in this era of economic
globalism: are the interests of MNEs conflictual with those of democratic governance?
The consensus in recent studies is that the above assumptions are false. Much to
the vindication of capitalists worldwide, the exact opposite seems to be true – MNEs
prefer to invest in countries whose governance is transparent, liberal, and democratic.
John Oneal was among the first to approach this subject quantitatively. In his paper,
The Affinity of Foreign Investors for Authoritarian Regimes, Oneal examined both the
flow and profitability of non-petroleum FDI to 22 developed countries and 26 less
developed countries (LDCs). Controlling for financial risk, business cycles, GDP
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growth, and military vs. civilian government, Oneal regressed FDI data from the U.S.
Department of Commerce (1950-1985) against an indicator for regime type. The study
operationalized regime type, autocracy vs. democracy, on -10 to +10 point scale using
weights ranging from “competitiveness of political participation” to “constraints on
chief executive” (Oneal, 573).
Oneal’s findings lend some support to the traditional assumption that U.S.
MNEs have performed best in autocratic states. When considering only LDCs, a one
point increase in a regime’s autocracy score increases profits by an average of 0.17
percent.1 It was also observed that, in the periphery, FDI flow was greater to autocratic
than democratic states.2 A regional-level examination of these findings has yielded
mixed results. When considering all countries, however, higher returns on FDI were
observed in developed democracies than in countries with autocratic regimes (though
results of FDI flow vis-à-vis regime type were insignificant).
More recently, Jensen sought to explicitly overturn the traditional assumption
through his study, Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political
Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment. Jensen hypothesized that MNEs
prefer to invest in states with democratic regimes (as opposed to autocratic ones)
because they confer less political risk to investments. Indeed, democratic governance
enhances cooperation between other states and corporations. More importantly,
however, democratic regimes are ultimately responsible to an electorate and, as such,
can make more credible commitments to not expropriate investments, nationalize
industry, or renegotiate contracts (Jensen, 594).
Jensen regressed net inflow FDI data from the World Bank against an indicator
for regime type similar to that which was used by Oneal. Improving upon previous
designs, however, Jensen included controls for natural resources and government
consumption levels. The results contradict Oneal’s with regard to his subsidiary
conclusion – that, ceteris paribus, MNEs prefer autocratic regimes when considering
only LDCs. Indeed, Jensen found that the MNE preference for democracy holds even
when considering only non-OECD countries. Jensen also concluded that democracy is
inversely correlated with sovereign default risk.

1
2

result only slightly significant: p < .10
result statistically insignificant
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With regard to the political climate literature, most studies have concluded that
the perception of political environment in a host country is one of the primary nonmarket determinants of FDI (Schollhammer and Nigh, 21). Nigh’s 1985 article, The
Effect of Political Events on United States Direct Foreign Investment: A Pooled TimeSeries Cross-Sectional Analysis, examined the relationship between manufacturing FDI
and political climate across 21 years and 24 countries. As an indicator for both
international and intranational cooperation and conflict, the study used Azar’s Conflict
and Peace Database (COPDAB). Control variable used in the regression included
market size, market growth, and others. On the basis of this data, Nigh concluded that
both international and intranational conflict and cooperation have a significant effect on
U.S. FDI to developing countries, whereas only international conflict and cooperation
affects U.S. FDI to the developed world.
Building upon this study, Tallman later examined the extent to which home
country political climate affects outflows of FDI – in other words, the factors lead
MNEs to seek investment opportunities abroad. The methodology is similar to Nigh’s
study, in which the COPDAB was used as an indicator for political climate and GDP
was controlled for. Results indicated a positive relationship between adverse political
conditions and the outflow of FDI from industrialized countries to the United States.
These findings are approximately consistent with the more recent literature.
Biglaiser and DeRouen, for example, examined the effect of regime type on U.S.
outbound FDI from 1965 to 2002 (Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2005). Their study included
controls for host country macroeconomics, governance, economic reforms, and U.S.
military presence, as well as lagged measures for natural resources, FDI, per capita
GDP, and both internal and external conflict (operationalized in Marshall’s ‘Societal
Effects of Warfare’ data, 2002). In this study, Biglaiser and DeRouen find that regime
type, though significant, has less an impact on U.S. outbound FDI (when political
stability is controlled for) than other variables in the study, such as market size and
governance. They also find that the effect of U.S. troops in a host country has a positive
and significant effect on flows of FDI.
In a similar study, Busse and Hefeker examined FDI data (1984–2003) to 83
developing countries (Busse and Hefeker, 2005). Their study used the PRS Group’s
International Country Risk Guide for its measures of political risk. Controls were
added for Gross National Income per capita and its growth rate, trade as a percentage of

6

GDP, and inflation. On the whole, Busse and Hefeker find support for their measures
of political risk as they relate to inflows of FDI, with government stability and quality
of bureaucracy being amongst the most significant of the PRS Group’s country-level
measures.

Extension:
The basic approach of this study is to introduce an indicator for the affect and density of
bilateral political ties to existing models of FDI. With few exceptions, FDI research has
been conducted at the country level of analysis and examined inflows or outflows to a
single home or host. This has limited the extent to which the determinants of FDI flows
can be generalized across time and space. As such, introducing a set of dyadic
explanatory variables into a fully cross-sectional model is an important next step in the
research on FDI.
Dyadic measures provide a far more realistic context for evaluating political risk
than country-level variables, which are limited to using a weighted average of bilateral
relations for each host. Also, framing the data within dyads allows us to evaluate
country specific determinants for both the home and host together. In addition, this
study includes a full cross section of OECD home countries, instead of limiting the data
to inflows from the United States. This allows us to examine the generalizability of
relationships for which support has been found in previous studies. For example, do
investors in all countries view the political risk associated with democratic and
autocratic political structures in the same way?
It is important to recognize that political risk varies not just by regime and
country but also by dyad. For instance, consider the United States’ post-9/11
relationship with Pakistan. One would expect inflows of FDI to the country to increase
as Pakistan becomes a strategic ally in the War on Terror – despite no macroeconomic
or regime changes in the country. Alternatively, consider the possibility for greater FDI
inflows from the United States to Indonesia during times of U.S. military presence in
Southeast Asia. Indeed, it is likely that the dichotomy between democracy and
autocracy in existing studies is overly simplistic. Investors desire protection for their
investments, and there is potential for this to be achieved either through investing in

7

democratic and transparent states, or through investing in autocratic states with clear
ties to the home country.
Using events-data, this paper examines the extent to which MNEs prefer to invest in
states with autocratic regimes whose national interests are aligned with those of the
home country. This scenario is intuitively sound, as there is potential for MNEs to reap
the benefits of low wages and preferential treatment associated with autocratic regimes,
while at the same time mitigate the political risk that typically pushes FDI toward
developed democracies. Pursuant to this intuition, this paper empirically tests the
following two hypotheses:
H1: Bilateral affect and political ties are positive determinants of FDI flows
within and between dyads.
H2: The relative importance of this relationship depends upon the nature of
political structures in the host country; ceteris paribus, bilateral affect and
political ties have a greater influence on inflows to autocratic states.

Methodology and Data:
Unlike past studies, which have examined FDI inflows or outflows to a single
home or host country, the dependent variable in this research is FDI inflows and net
flows3 from the nearly 30 member nations of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) to 61 host countries over a period of ten years
(1991–2000).4 Capital flows within each of the 1,712 dyads were aggregated into a
common currency using market exchange rates. Ideally, the chosen aggregation metric
should have accounted for the relative price difference between host countries;
however, the only widely available statistical construct – Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP) – is based upon baskets of consumer goods and is thus an inappropriate proxy for
the input prices of industrial production.
Inflows of FDI within a dyad refer to transfers of investment dollars from a
home to host country. For example, when U.S. MNEs contribute money to investment
3
4

Calculated as outflows minus inflows
See Appendix A
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projects in China, a positive inflow within the U.S. – China dyad is registered in the
data. Some of the greatest inflows in the data were observed between the U.S. and
United Kingdom. Net flows of FDI refer to outflows minus inflows within a given
dyad; in other words, the amount of investment dollars that flow from the host to the
home, minus those that flow in the opposite direction. As such, one might expect
negative net flows between the United States and a smaller (though lucrative) economy
(U.S. – France, 1990), or positive net flows if the United States were to be defined as
the host country in that same scenario (United Kingdom – U.S., late 1990s)
Negative net flows would also be observed if the host country in a given dyad
were disproportionately more attractive or hospitable to foreign investors than the home
(Japan – U.S., late 1990s). Alternatively, high net flows could be interpreted to show
capital flight from loss of investor confidence. For example, during times of political
instability in Country A, U.S. investors may choose to decrease inflows of foreign
investment to that country, while investors in Country A maintain confidence (and
outflows of investment) to the United States. In the data, some of the highest net flows
are found between the United States and Brazil in 1990, and between Belgium and
Brazil during that same year. This was likely the result of Brazil’s economic instability,
which contributed to large negative inflows to Brazil from those countries.
The first group of independent variables in this study was constructed using
events-data from the Virtual Research Associates (VRA). The VRA’s Reader parses
text from the headings of Reuters news articles and codes them according to 195 event
categories, ranging from apologies to military seizures. The process is fully automatic
and accurate to a degree consistent with that of undergraduate coders (King and Lowe
2001, 14). This study used VRA’s codes for 3.7 million international dyadic events,
involving 201 countries for the years 1991-2000. In essence, the data provides a
quantitative summary of the who/what/when/and where of 3.7 million events. Instead
of broadly categorizing dyadic conflict and cooperation based on limited weighting
schemes and surveys, events-data analysis allows an appraisal to be made that is
exhaustive of public discourse worldwide. Given that the perception of political
climate largely drives the risk-factored investment decisions of MNEs, VRA provides
what is perhaps the ideal metric for examining the relationship between FDI and dyadic
political climate.
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In order to contextualize the 3.7 million VRA events, a normative weighting
scheme for cooperation and conflict was introduced to the data. For the purposes of this
study, the Goldstein Scale (GS) was chosen because of its wide use in the International
Relations literature. The GS uses a [-10, +10] point range to denote gradations of
cooperation and conflict at both the state and dyadic levels of analysis. The weights, in
conjunction with the VRA events, could be used to approximate positive/negative affect
(accept/deny, praise/denounce, etc.), political ties (improve/break relations, ease/tighten
sanctions, etc.), and dependency (requests for/promises of military, economic, and
humanitarian aid). To put a few event categories in context of the weighting scheme,
military engagements, occupations, and coups receive a negative 10, whereas promises
of military, economic, and humanitarian aid lie at the other end of the spectrum. Events
receiving a zero (or neutral) score, include sports contests, arts & entertainment
performances, etc.
Using the GS as a weighting scheme, the sum and count of VRA events were
computed for every dyad-year:
Χ Dyad-year (VRA, GS)
This study aggregated scores for home source and home target (that is, when the home
is the source and target, respectively, of action within a dyad). Normal quantile plots
revealed that the count measure was skewed heavily to the right and, as such, the
variable was logged. Ultimately, for every dyad-year, there were two different onevalue summaries of bilateral affect and political ties:
VRA-G Sum = Home Source Sum + Home Target Sum
VRA-G Count = Log [Home Source Count + Home Target Count]
By way of example, in 1998 the France–Brazil Home Source/Target Count was 46; in
other words, the actions committed by France to Brazil in 1998, and vice-versa,
registered as 46 unique Goldstein-relevant events in the popular press.
The VRA-Goldstein Count variable was formulated to measure the density of
bilateral relations. To provide some examples from the data, the highest VRAGoldstein Count observed was between the U.S. – United Kingdom in 1999. In that
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dyad-year, 1,853 unique Goldstein-relevant events were captured by VRA’s data. Other
high Counts during the 1990s include Japan – U.S. (1677), Canada – U.S. (898), U.S. –
China (831), and U.K. – China (853). Some of the lowest Counts in the data set include
dyads such as Poland – Bulgaria and Finland – Canada.
The VRA-Goldstein Sum variable was formulated to measure both the density
and affect of bilateral relations. Not surprisingly, many of the lowest Sums observed in
the data are between countries with bitter histories of conflict. For example, the most
negative Sum (-451) was found between France and Algeria in 1997. Incidentally, the
vast majority of that score (97%) is comprised of events in which France was the source
of action. Other large negative Sums are observed within dyads such as Turkey –
Germany, U.S. – Iran, and Australia – Indonesia. At the other end of the spectrum lie
dyads such as U.S. – China, Japan – U.S., and U.S – United Kingdom, which have some
of the highest Sums in the data.
Consistent with the design of existing research on the non-market determinants
of FDI, this study also included a number of control variables. The first of these was
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, aggregated into a common currency using
PPP and logged to correct for a skewed distribution. This measure, in conjunction with
Population, is a commonly accepted proxy for market size and an economy’s ability to
absorb FDI (Jensen). A measure for Human Capital (operationalized in this study as a
country’s illiteracy rate) was also included. Other authors, such as Jensen, have used
Average Schooling of Workforce in this instance, but unfortunately the coverage of that
data was prohibitively sparse for the country and time sample of this study. The next
control variable was Inflation Rate. According to Philipp Harms and others, this
variable can be used as a proxy for a country’s macroeconomic management –
something that is no doubt of interest to international investors (Harms 2001, 6). As
was mentioned previously, an abundance of natural resources can increase the
profitability of FDI in a given host country; as such, a measure for Primary Exports was
also included – operationalized as % of total exports, Σ Dyad-year (food, fuel, agriculture,
mines/ores). Finally, a measure for Economic Openness (operationalized as trade
volume as % of GDP) was used as a proxy for FDI inflow controls, a measure for which
there was no data. Data for each of these measures was included for both the home and
host country for every dyad-year in the sample.
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Incidentally, this list of controls is by no means exhaustive of the FDI literature.
However, inclusion of the following variables was either impossible given the extent of
publicly available data, or unwise given the systematic gaps in coverage for the counties
included in this study. These include the Profitability of FDI (which is, in itself, biased
by MNE’s incentives to hide profits from their home country), Financial Risk
(operationalized as the standard deviation of returns to FDI), FDI Inflow Controls,
Business Cycles, and Military vs. Civilian Government. Some authors have also
included a measure for Political Risk. For this purpose, Harms and others have used
data taken from the PRS Groups’ International Country Risk Guide. This proprietary
data forecasts political risk and, as such, is an inappropriate metric for this study
because it does not gauge the average investor’s perception of dyadic political risk.
In order to test the second hypothesis (H2), that bilateral political affect and
political ties have a greater influence on FDI inflows to autocratic states (as opposed to
democratic ones), a mean-centered interaction term was formulated that includes a
quantitative measure of host country political structures. Polity IV scores, published by
the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) at the
University of Maryland, denote the range of autocracy to democracy on a [-10, +10]
point scale for every host country in the sample.5 The country to receive the most
autocratic score (-10) was Saudi Arabia. Many Middle-Eastern countries followed
closely with Kuwait (-9), United Arab Emirates (-8) and Morroco (-8). Countries
receiving scores in the middle of the democracy-autocracy scale include Mexico and
Thailand. The most democratic countries (those receiving a 10) include Switzerland,
the United Kingdom, Japan, Spain, and others. The interaction term was constructed as
follows:
[Χ Dyad-year (VRA, GS) – µ Χ(VRA, GS)] * [(Host polity) Dyad-year – µ Host polity]
The error covariance matrix of time series cross section data violates the
standard assumptions of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions in that error terms
are typically correlated across time within a cross-sectional value (i.e. autocorrelation)
and across units at a moment in time (i.e. heteroskedacity). While there are a range of
5

-10 = complete autocracy; +10 = complete democracy.
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alternatives to adjust for these conditions, Liang and Zenger highlight the benefits of a
population-averaged data model (see also, McCullough, P. and J.A. Jelder,
1989). Another approach championed by Beck and Katz (1995) is the use of panelcorrected standard errors. We employ both of these methods both with and without
country fixed effects.

Predictions:
In accordance with the findings of existing research, this study predicted that GDP per
capita is a positive and significant determinant of FDI for both the home and host
country. When taken with the independent variables of home and host population (both
of which were expected to be negatively correlated with inflows of FDI), GDP per
capita approximates market size. According to Jensen, a large economy in the host
country implies that it can absorb large flows of foreign direct investment (Jensen
2003); similarly, a large economy in the home country implies that there is sufficient
capital to fund new and ongoing multinational investment projects.
This study also predicted that host country human capital is a positive and
significant determinant of FDI inflows, as (ceteris paribus) education and productivity
are directly related vis-à-vis a given country’s workforce. As such, it was expected that
host country illiteracy rates are negatively correlated with inflows of FDI. With regard
to the home country, the prediction for human capital is less clear: on the one hand,
greater human capital implies a more productive workforce and thus less incentive to
seek investment opportunities abroad; and on the other, human capital is highly
correlated with per capita GDP – a positive determinant of FDI flows. The latter of
these two effects is likely to predominate and, as such, this study predicted that, if
significant, the coefficient for home country illiteracy would be negative as well. While
there are admittedly better proxies for human capital than literacy, the available data for
net educational attainment was prohibitively sparse for the country and time sample of
this study.
Inflation rates were used as a proxy for the macroeconomic management of host
and home countries. With regard to the host country, it was predicted that inflation
rates are negatively correlated with FDI, as higher levels of inflation generally imply
macroeconomic mismanagement and thus increased financial risk to investment

13

projects. To the extent that an abundance of natural resources can imply lower input
prices and greater returns on investment, it was predicted that the measure for host
country primary exports (as a percentage of total exports) is positively correlated with
inflows of FDI. With regard to the home country, primary exports were expected to be
indirectly correlated with flows of FDI; indeed, ceteris paribus, greater natural
resources imply that home input prices are lower relative to a potential host. Finally, it
was expected that the last control variable – trade as a percentage of GDP – is positively
correlated with FDI. This is consistent with the findings of previous studies, which have
used trade as a proxy for economic openness and FDI inflow controls (Harms 2001) –
something for which there is little data.
As mentioned previously, studies by Jensen, Harms, and others have
independently shown that flows of FDI are attracted to states with democratic and
transparent regimes. As such, it was expected that inflows of FDI are positively
correlated with host country Polity IV scores. Indeed, the more democratic a regime,
the greater the audience cost for mistreating MNEs, the less political risk to investment,
and the more hospitable a country for FDI (Jensen, 2001).
Finally, with regard the first hypothesis of this study (H1) – that bilateral affect
and political ties are positive determinants of FDI flows within and between dyads – it
was predicted that VRA-G Sum and Count are both positive and significant. With
regard to the second hypothesis (H2), that bilateral affect and political ties have a greater
influence on inflows to autocratic states, it was predicted that the interaction term would
be both negative and significant.
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Results:
Pursuant to the above data and methodology, there exists limited support for the first
hypothesis of this study. In the limited controls model the VRA-Goldstein Count
variable appears to be robust across regression types and for both FDI inflows and
netflows. The Sum variable is less robust, with significance registering only in the
population-averaged netflow model.6 The initial regressions included only controls for
market size, but the relationship held when other controls were added as well. The
relationship also held in cases where net flow was used as the dependent variable. The
regressions that were conducted with lags and fixed effects yielded similar (though less
robust) results.
With regard to the first hypothesis, the fact that VRA-G Count was most
significant implies that perhaps density of bilateral relations is more important than their
type. This would make sense if, for instance, it could be shown that a high number of
events within a dyad implies intrinsic audience interests in each country, greater media
coverage of the relationship, and thus greater accountability for foreign investors.
The somewhat more limited support found with data lags implies that reverse
causation may, in fact, be a problem. This is consistent with the findings of recent
studies, which have shown that FDI breeds cooperative relations (Polachek et. al.,
2004). Further complication derives from the operational and decision lags of political
risk-factored changes to foreign investment projects.
Contrary to hypothesis H2, the mean-averaged interaction term is always
positive when significant, with the clearest relationship being observed in the
population-averaged and Prais-Winsten lagged models using VRA-Goldstein Count and
FDI inflows. With regard to the Count variable, this result indicates that density of
bilateral relations does not positively affect inflows of FDI to autocratic countries in a
manner that is disproportionately larger than to that of democratic countries.
The regime type variable, Host Polity, is significant only in the Prais-Winsten
lagged model using VRA-Goldstein Count and FDI inflows. Though by no means
6

Regressions using VRA-G Sum yielded less robust results, as the variable was only significant when net
flows were used as the dependent variable. While the explanation for this is unclear, one possible reason
deals with the aggregation of summed scores (both positive and negative) vis-à-vis instances in which the
home is the target and source of bilateral action.
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robust, the coefficient of this variable has a sign that is inconsistent with recent
literature, which has found that inflows of FDI are attracted to democratic and
transparent regimes moreso than autocratic ones. According to the regression, an
increase in a country’s Polity IV score actually decreases inflows of FDI. As expected,
the coefficient of GDP per capita is positive when significant for both the home and
host country. Taken together with home and host country population, which is also
positive when significant, this indicates that market size is a positive determinant of FDI
inflows as they relates to capital abundance and FDI absorption, respectively. Lagged
inflows of FDI are also positive when significant.
The above relationships were maintained when additional controls were added,
though the coefficient on Host Polity was no longer significant in any model. Home
and Host Trade, the two measures for economic openness, were the most significant
additional variables, with effects being observed in the inflow models of both VRAGoldstein Sum and Count. None of the remaining independent variables not in the
limited controls model had robust effects. In addition, there were no systematic
differences observed between control variables in the VRA-Goldstein Count versus Sum
models.
Though intuitively sound, either the hypothesis, design of the study (or both) is
flawed. In addition, with regard to the control variables in this study, including Polity
IV scores for the host country, few coefficients were significant. While the reason for
this is unclear, the systematic gaps in data coverage for the time and country sample of
this study was likely a factor.7

7

The variables for home and host illiteracy were dropped altogether because they reduced the sample size
by nearly an order or magnitude.
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Flaws:
Several potential flaws of this study deal with the VRA data itself. Given that VRA only
tracks events that appear in English-language newspapers, it is unclear to what extent this
measure can be used to approximate investors’ perception of dyadic risk around the
world. However, this concern was mitigated by the fact that the above results were
consistent with subsequent regressions that examined inflows from only the United
States, the United Kingdom, and both. Another potential flaw is that the limited time
span for VRA’s publicly available data (ten years) makes it difficult to examine variation
within dyads. Finally, there is sometimes a significant lag between when an event occurs
and when it is reported. Ideally, the VRA/Goldstein measure should approximate the
time at which international investors receive, and can reasonably incorporate into
investment decisions, the information at hand; unfortunately, because reporting, decision,
and operational lags vary widely, the event date was the most precise option available.
What exacerbates each of these problems is that many psychological biases blur
perceptions of risk. Consider, for instance, the possibility for diminishing sensitivity to
negative (or positive) events; logging the VRA-Goldstein Count measure was intended to
partially correct for this, but it is unclear to what extent this action was appropriate or
sufficient. Also, consider the tendency for people to discount low probability but high
impact events (Messick et. al., 1996), or the reality that investors are often use a biased
subset of public discourse to make business decisions based upon dyadic risk. Even if
quantifiable, these effects could not easily be corrected for in future studies.
There is also an issue with the event categories themselves. While military
engagements and economic aid within dyads are undeniably important to international
investors, this study intended to examine bilateral affect and political ties as they relate to
political risk to investment. As such, the VRA data should have also included event
categories for the renegotiation of contracts, nationalization of industries, and
expropriation of investments. Unfortunately, this was not possible given the publicly
available data. Finally, much like the VRA event categories, it is not clear that the
normative weightings of the Goldstein scale reflect the true preferences and concerns of
international investors. There have been some efforts to revise the scale for this purpose,
but unfortunately nothing was available as of this year.
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Conclusions:
What has motivated much of the recent literature on FDI is the question: Are the interests
of MNEs conflictual with those of democratic governance? A positive response to this
could have profound implications for public policy and international development, but
the consensus in recent literature is clear – inflows of FDI are attracted to states with
democratic and transparent regimes. While this study intended to qualify that finding by
introducing a measure for bilateral affect and political ties – and thus political risk to
investments – the consensus remains unchallenged. However, this study demonstrated
that a dyadic design for examining the non-market determinants of FDI is plausible, and
that significant effects exist at that level of analysis. The most robust new variable – a
simple count of bilateral events between countries – should be further examined to
uncover why the density of bilateral relations, both positive and negative, has the
tendency to increase flows of FDI within dyads.

\
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Appendix A
FDI Home Country List:

FDI Host Country List:

Australia
Austria
Belgium-Luxembourg
Canada
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovak Republic
Spain Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States

Algeria
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium-Luxembourg
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
China
Chinese Taipei
Colombia
Costa Rica
Czech Republic
Denmark
Egypt
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea
21

Kuwait
Libya
Malaysia
Mexico
Morocco
Netherlands
Netherlands Antilles
New Zealand
Norway
Panama
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Republic Slovak
Romania
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Thailand
Turkey
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States
Venezuela

Appendix B
Goldstein Scale and relevant VRA event categories:
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